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Review: Is Hedge Fund Registration 
Necessary? 
J.W. Verret∗ 
In Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary To 
Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?,1 Luke 
Ashworth sets out a formidable case that questions the grounds 
for the mandatory hedge fund registration requirement contained 
in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd–Frank Act).2 This review of his Note will offer a 
description of the piece’s key strengths, suggest some challenges 
to the solutions it offers, and close with suggestions about areas 
that might build on Ashworth’s work in future scholarship.  
I. Review 
A. The Argument 
Ashworth lays out a well-researched background of the 
history of the hedge fund industry, prior attempts to regulate the 
industry, and the complex regulatory regime that previously 
exempted the industry from mandatory registration which was 
amended by the Dodd–Frank Act. 
He explores the underlying justification for the mandatory 
registration rule by describing hedge fund crises at Long-Term 
Capital Management in 1999 and two Bear Stearns hedge funds 
during 2007. He notes how the drafters of the hedge fund 
registration rule were motivated by a desire to prevent investor 
fraud and to minimize and monitor systemic risk. 
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 1. Luther R. Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary 
to Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 651 (2013). 
 2. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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Ashworth’s skepticism of the mandatory registration 
requirement as a response to the financial crisis is even stronger 
than he suggests. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s 
(FCIC) Final Report on the Causes of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis in the United States mentions hedge funds quite 
infrequently, and even when it does so it does not describe their 
involvement in any way that would support the mandatory 
registration provision.3 While hedge funds were active 
participants in markets for asset-backed securities that quickly 
lost value in the financial crisis,4 it is unclear that they were 
more aggressive than other investors. Indeed, many hedge funds 
also took short positions in real estate-derived assets, and 
companies invested in them, that can be credited with popping 
the asset bubble before it grew even bigger.5 
It is also unclear how registration would have affected those 
funds that played a role in the asset bubble. For example, the 
FCIC Report examines the role of “hedge funds” at Bear Stearns 
that had significant positions in mortgage-backed securities, 
which ultimately brought down the investment bank in 2007 and 
eventually led to the government-facilitated takeover of the bank 
by JP Morgan in 2008.6 But Bear Stearns was not an unregulated 
entity—in fact it was much more heavily regulated under the 
Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Consolidated 
Supervised Entity (CSE) capital regulation program than the 
investment adviser registration regime that hedge funds will be 
subject to post-Dodd–Frank.7 
                                                                                                     
 3. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, at xi (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (reporting “to the President, the Congress, 
and the American people the results of [the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission’s] examinations and conclusions as to the causes of the crisis”). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 136 (noting that hedge funds often invested in asset-
backed securities, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations). 
 5. See, e.g., Lauren Schuker Blum, John Paulson Double Down, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 19, 2012, at M3 (“Hedge-fund manager John Paulson famously made 
nearly $4 billion in 2007 correctly betting that the housing bubble, fueled by the 
subprime mortgage market, would pop.”). 
 6. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxi. 
 7. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S 
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED 
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Ashworth accepts that large hedge funds had a prominent 
role in the financial crisis but argues that the registration 
requirement is overbroad from an alternative perspective. 
Ashworth effectively demonstrates that the redundancy created 
by Dodd–Frank, in which both the Office of Financial Research 
(OFR) under the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
and the SEC will serve as information coordinators, will not aid 
systemic risk oversight and may cause its own problems. The 
reader is left convinced that information-reporting requirements, 
for the same purpose but from different regulators, will 
compound compliance costs and may even create mutually 
inconsistent reporting requirements. 
If systemic risk is the issue, it is unclear whether and to 
what extent creating multiple information-collection entities, in 
both the SEC and the OFR at the Treasury Department, will 
provide additional value. Where the OFR will be able to 
coordinate with the FSOC, charged with systemic risk 
determinations, the SEC will be a step removed from the central 
decision-making and will have to coordinate through multiple 
layers to obtain useful information. Redundancies in this area 
will not be costless, but will add multiple layers of compliance 
requirements and multiply the risk that proprietary trading 
information will be revealed to market competitors. 
Ashworth’s argument would have been edified by considering 
the SEC’s failure to respond appropriately to tips it received and 
preliminary inquiries it initiated in the Madoff and Stanford 
cases, both generally recognized as exceptional failures by the 
agency to catch multi-billion dollar Ponzi schemes despite the 
hedge funds being voluntarily registered with the SEC, and 
despite the Madoff broker-dealer subsidiary having received 
successful compliance audits from the SEC prior to the frauds 
                                                                                                     
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM, at v (2008), http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/ 
AuditsInspections/ 2008/446-a.pdf (“The [CSE] program is a voluntary program 
that was created in 2004 by the [SEC] . . . . This program allows the [SEC] to 
supervise [certain] broker-dealer holding companies on a consolidated basis.”). 
Thus, the CSE program allowed the SEC to supervise Bear Stearns prior to the 
financial crisis in a manner that “extend[ed] beyond the registered broker-dealer 
to the unregulated affiliates of the broker-dealer to the holding company itself.” 
Id. After the collapse of Bear Stearns, the SEC stated that even with increased 
oversight, “[I]t is undisputable that the CSE program failed to carry out its 
mission in its oversight of Bear Stearns . . . .” Id. at viii. 
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being revealed.8 Even worse, after examining the Stanford funds, 
the SEC compliance staff suggested to the SEC enforcement staff 
that it was probably a Ponzi scheme, whereupon the SEC 
enforcement staff nevertheless decided against taking action.9 
Though the legislative history of Dodd–Frank references both 
objectives of fraud prevention and systemic risk oversight,10 it 
remains unclear whether the mandatory registration 
requirement was more predominantly an investor protection 
measure or a systemic risk measure. If the latter, a critique of the 
SEC’s response to the Madoff and Stanford cases remains 
relevant. 
B. Review of Ashworth’s Recommendations 
While the Note offers skepticism of the ability of the SEC to 
monitor systemic risk, it accepts the general notion that large 
financial players implicate systemic concerns. It is important to 
note that during the financial crisis, many hedge funds made bets 
against the real estate bubble, in effect correcting a wayward 
market.11 Hedge funds have enjoyed a level of investment 
flexibility and freedom from regulatory rigidity that has 
historically led them to take a commanding role in short selling, 
which helps to foster a vibrant price discovery function and 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & 
Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Examinations by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Issues Raised by the Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities Matter (Jan. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts112709lar.htm (“Examinations of the 
Madoff broker-dealer firm did not find the alleged fraud committed by Mr. 
Madoff, and the [SEC’s] staff did not examine his advisory opinions, which first 
became registered with the [SEC] in late 2006.”). 
 9. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO 
CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 16 
(2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf (providing an 
executive summary of the SEC’s role in the Stanford Ponzi scheme). 
 10. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-57, at 866 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CRPT-111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf (stating that Title IV of the Dodd–
Frank Act “expands the advisers’ reporting requirements to the SEC as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors or for the assessment of risk by the FSOC”). 
 11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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provides liquidity to the market.12 Therefore, Ashworth’s 
suggestion for a compromise approach focusing on systemic risk 
oversight of larger firms must nevertheless take into account the 
possibility that his compromise approach may also inhibit those 
functions served by the hedge fund industry. 
Ashworth accepts the popular argument that size is the key 
dimension of systemic risk, relying on work seeking to give 
preliminary definition to systemic risk by Schwarcz.13 But it 
should also be noted that another important vein of scholarship 
discounts the role of size in systemic risk.14 
As Ashworth notes, the SEC has left jurisdiction over hedge 
fund registration for firms with assets under management 
between $25 million and $100 million to states. The compromise 
he suggests would be complicated by the SEC’s current allocation 
of authority between the states and the federal government. 
Small firms would be registered with states, medium-sized firms 
would be unregistered, and larger firms would be regulated by 
the FSOC. This donut hole of unregulated companies may create 
some potentially costly unintended consequences. 
The existence of even light-touch regulation pursuant to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 194015 or the FSOC may serve merely 
as a prelude to subsequent enhanced regulation. A few high 
profile problems in the hedge fund sector could mean the SEC or 
the FSOC, or the Federal Reserve as regulator of designated 
systemically significant financial institutions, will feel pressure 
to enhance its regulatory authority in this area from the existing 
investment adviser oversight to a new regime mirroring the 
investment company or publicly-traded company model, in which 
disclosure methodologies become mandatory, the ability of 
investment managers to communicate with investors and 
                                                                                                     
 12. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 815 
(2007) (explaining vital roles hedge funds play in the U.S. economy). 
 13. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 
(2008). 
 14. See Chen Zhou, Are Banks Too Big to Fail? Measuring Systemic 
Importance of Financial Institutions, 6 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 205, 205 (2010) 
(“Both the theoretical model and empirical analysis reveal that, when analyzing 
the systemic risk posed by one financial institution to the system, size should 
not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance.”). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2010). 
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potential investors will be limited to regulatory approved forms, 
and the investment strategies will be directly or indirectly 
regulated by the SEC. If that occurs, it would seriously damage 
the liquidity and price discovery functions the hedge fund 
industry serves. 
II. Groundwork for Future Inquiry 
There are two readily apparent avenues for further research 
that might build on Ashworth’s successful Note in future work. 
The newly passed Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act)16 includes a lift on the general solicitation ban found in 
Regulation D, one which hedge funds frequently use in soliciting 
investments.17 Further, the fact that the hedge fund industry 
itself embraced the mandatory registration regime, or at least did 
not fight against it, presents a puzzle for which public choice 
theory may provide an answer. 
Henry Manne’s work in the public choice dynamics of 
securities regulation suggests that one motivating force behind 
the development of the securities laws is that large incumbent 
firms seek to stifle competition from newer, upstart entrants to 
markets by supporting regulations that increase the costs of 
entry into markets.18 If any participants in the hedge fund 
industry supported the mandatory registration rule, this could 
explain why. 
Another suggestion for further inquiry would be to consider 
how changes found in the JOBS Act will change Luke’s 
argument. Among the provisions of the JOBS Act is a 
requirement that the SEC lift the ban against general 
solicitations under Regulation D.19 This is an exemption 
frequently used by hedge funds. What does lifting the general 
                                                                                                     
 16. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.) 
 17. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-9354 (Aug. 29, 2012). 
 18. See generally HENRY G. MANNE ET AL., WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE 
EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY (1974). 
 19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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solicitation ban do to his investor sophistication argument? Will 
the fact that hedge funds will be able to communicate with 
potential investors more broadly significantly alter the cost–
benefit calculus behind the mandatory registration rule? Or will 
the fact that hedge funds will still be limited to investments by 
accredited investors minimize the impact of the JOBS Act on this 
discussion? 
III. Conclusion 
Ashworth’s work is provocative and insightful, and offers a 
unique willingness to question the conventional wisdom behind a 
popular item in the Dodd–Frank Act. It opens the door for future 
inquiry into this new avenue of securities regulation and suggests 
exciting opportunities for thinking about the SEC’s hedge fund 
regulatory regime with veins of thought in the securities 
regulatory, finance, and public choice scholarship. 
  
